52		SECRET 2	(
Action		Control: 19521 E. C. Dili, Rec'd: OCTOBER 28, 196	<u>-</u>
SS Info	FROM: PARIS	ENDISTRIEVIEW 5:26 PM	
	TO: Secretary of	State transferred to O/FARMS Cat. B - Transferred to O/FARMS	
	NO: POLTO CIRCULA	R 1-2, OCTOBER 28 ontrolled by (SECTION 1 OF 11) Cat. C - Caption and custody	
٠.	NIACT	retained by S/S Reviewed by: Elijah Kelly Jr Pate: 3/11/58	

DEPCIRTELS 744 778 AND TOPOLS 574 578

FOLLOWING DETAILED REPORT SPECIAL NAC MEETING 1000 28TH (HIGHLIGHTS POLTO 512).

ACTING SECRETARY GENERAL (COLONNA) OPENED MEETING BY ANNOUNCING UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAD ASKED FOR SPECIAL MEETING IN ORDER INFORM NAC LATEST CUBAN DEVELOPMENTS.

US THEN OPENED REMARKS BY EMPHASIZING SERIOUSNESS OF SITUATION AND NEED TO GET SOONEST REACTION NATO GOVERNMENTS TO VARIOUS POINTS THAT WE WOULD RAISE AND ACTION WE HAVE TAKEN AS OUTLINED REFTELS. HE STATED THAT WHILE REALIZED MOST PERM REPS COULD NOT GIVE AGREED GOVERNMENT POSITIONS. HE HOPED THEY WOULD INDICATE AS FULLY AS POSSIBLE THEIR PERSONAL REACTIONS AND WHAT THEY THOUGHT THEIR GOVERNMENTS! REACTIONS WOULD BE. US THEN PARAPHRASED GENERAL US EVALU-ATION SOVIET POLICY CONTAINED CIRCR 744. THEN READ AND DISTRIBUTED WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT CONTAINED CIRCR 788. HE FOLLOWED THIS WITH GIST TOPOL 578 CONTAINING BRIEFING PRESIDENT DESIRED BE GIVEN NAC. AFTER GIVING GIST PARA 4 THIS TELEGRAM HE GAVE GIST TYLER-HILSMAN-NITZE BRIEFING LATEST DEVELOPMENTS CONTAINED TOPOL 574 BEFORE FINISHING REST OF MATERIAL CONTAINED TOPOL 578. WE ALSO DISTRIBUTED AT MEETING WIRELESS BULLETIN OCTOBER 28 CONTAINING AMONG OTHER THINGS TEXT PRESIDENT S LETTER TO KHRUSHCHEV 27TH.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR	SECRET	BELGIAN REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY I PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIE
REVIEWED by DATE DATE	3/34/58	PROFIBETED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIE
POI, 120 or Ph occupations (b) (1)		
() CLASSETY on To authority to:	ADI	

-2- POLTO CIRCULAR 12, OCTOBER 28, 8 PM (SECTION 1 OF 11), FROM PARIS

BELGIAN OPENED QUESTIONING BY ASKING WHETHER PRESIDENT HAD FLATLY REJECTED CUBAN_TURKISH DEAL WITHOUT LEAVING DOOR OPEN FOR SOME LATER NEGOTIATIONS. AFTER SOME DISCUSSION AND STUDY WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, IT AGREED US POSITION CALLED FOR LIQUIDATION OFFENSIVE MISSILE BASES CUBA BEFORE ANY OTHER MATTERS COULD BE DISCUSSED OR NEGOTIATED WITHIN OR OUTSIDE THE GENERAL SPHERE OF DISARMAMENT.

CANADA THEN READ HIGHLIGHTS OF LONG DIEFENBAKER STATEMENT OF OCTOBER 25 BACKING US POSITION AND THEN GAVE HIGHLIGHTS OF TALK BETWEEN GREEN AND CUBAN AMBASSADOR OTTAWA. LATTER, SPEAKING UNDER INSTRUCTIONS, HAD ASKED CANADA TO PASS ON TO US THAT (1) CUBA, WHETHER WE TRY TO STARVE ? IT TO DEATH OR NOT, WILL FIGHT TO THE LAST MAN IF ATTACKED; (2) NEVERTHELESS, CUBA WILLING TO NEGOTIATE; AND (3) CUBA WELCOMED SUGGESTION THAT QUARANTINE BE SUSPENDED FOR TIME BEING. GREEN REPLIED MOST IMPORTANT THAT CUBANS UNDER-STAND DANGER OF PERMITTING SUCH OFFENSIVE WEAPONS ON THEIR TERRITORY, WHICH POSED A DIRECT THREAT TO CANADA AS WELL AND UNDERLINED THAT THESE WEAPONS MUST BE REMOVED. AMBASSADOR STATED DID NOT BELIEVE THE WEAFONS WERE OFFENSIVE AND STATED CASTRO WOULD REFUSE INSPECTIONS, BUT HE HINTED THAT UNDER SOME CIRCUMSTANCES INSPECTIONS MIGHT BE PERMITTED! PROVIDED ASSURANCES GIVEN US WOULD NOT INVADE CUBA. GREEN REITERATED DANGER OF OFFENSIVE WEAPONS WHICH. IF ALLOWED TO STAY THERE, COULD MEAN DESTRUCTION OF ENTIRE ISLAND

CHARGE IN WHICH LATTER EXPRESSED WOULD USE INFLUENCE PREVENT MATTERS GOING OVER BRINK, TO WHICH REPLIED SOVIET ACTION IN CUBA HAD UPSET BALANCE AND THIS MUST BE REDRESSED, AND STATED IN REPLY TO SOVIET QUESTION REGARDING QUARANTINE THAT ANY COUNTRY HAD THE RIGHT TO ACT IN SELF-DEFENSE AS BEST IT SAW FIT. IN VIEW OF THIS OBVIOUS POWER PLAY IN CUBA, DESPITE ASSURANCES TO THE CONTRARY, IT MADE IT VERY DIFFICULT FOR TO WORK WITH SOVIET UNION WHEN THEY DID NOT TELL THE TRUTH.

(b)(i

3/A3

-3- POLTO CIRCULAR 12, OCTOBER 28, 8 PM (SECTION I OF II), FROM PARIS

REITERATED FIRST INGREDIENT WAS TO GET RID OF THE WEAPONS IN CUBA, AFTER WHICH IT IS MOST IMPORTANT TO TRY TO NEGOTIATE AND WORK OUT OTHER ARRANGEMENTS IN DISARMAMENT AS WELL AS IN OTHER FIELDS IN ORDER TO LESSEN TENSION IF POSSIBLE AND PUT NATO IN BEST DEFENSIVE POSITION. HE IMPLIED WITHOUT GOING INTO DETAILS HE HAD IN MIND WORKING OUT SOME ARRANGEMENT TO REPLACE JUPITERS BY MORE EFFECTIVE WEAPONS. (HE HAD VOLUNTEERED RPT VOLUNTEERED TO ME PREVIOUSLY THAT HE HAD IN MIND THE DESIRABILITY OF SETTING UP A NATO MULTILATERAL FORCE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN TO REPLACE OBSOLETE JUPITERS IN BOTH TURKEY AND ITALY.) US ASSURED THAT WE NOT OPPOSED TO NEGOTIATIONS OR ARRANGEMENTS IN OTHER FIELDS AS WELL AS DISARMAMENT, AND PARTICULARLY NOT OPPOSED TO STRENGTHEN NATO DEFENSES PROVIDED CUBAN MATTER SETTLED SATISFACTORILY.

STATED HIS GOVERNMENT SUPPORTED THE UNITED ISTATES POSITION RE CUBA GENERALLY AND SPECIFICALLY THAT WE MUST GET RID OF THE WEAPONS BEFORE ANY OTHER SETTLEMENT OR ARRANGEMENTS COULD BE MADE. HE ADDED HOWEVER IT WAS GRATIFYING TO LEARN THAT US DID NOT OPPOSE NEGOTIATIONS ONCE THREAT AND BLACKMAIL HAD CEASED. SUNDER INSTRUCTIONS HE URGED THAT EVERY EFFORT BE MADE TO CONTINUE DIPLOMATIC ACTION AND AVOID IN EVERY WAY POSSIBLE DIRECT ACTION BY USE OF FORCE WHICH MIGHT MEAN THAT MATTERS WOULD GET COMPLETELY OUT OF HAND.

SECRET

-4- POLTO CIRCULAR 12, OCTOBER 28, 8 PM (SECTION 1 OF 11), FROM PARIS

HE ADDED WHILE HE SURE HIS GOVT DESIRED EVENTUAL NEGOTIATIONS WITH SOVIETS THEY SHOULD NOT CONSTITUTE IN ANY
WAY ANYTHING THAT MIGHT LOOK LIKE APPEASEMENT.

WITH US, THE STATED THAT WHILE HE HAD NO INSTRUCTIONS HE SURE HIS GOVERNMENT TOOK SIMILAR POSITION TO
THAT OF AND UNDERLINED THAT THE ALLIANCE SHOULD OF
COURSE, DO EVERYTHING TO UNDERLINE THE DETERRENT. HE ADDED
DETERRENT MEANS TO AVOID WAR, AND THEREFORE HOPED THAT
EFFORTS WOULD BE MADE TO PREVENT HOSTILITIES FROM BREAKING
OUT, SINCE HE FEARED WEST NOT NOW READY FOR MAJOR
MILITARY ENGAGEMENT. THEN ASKED WHETHER THERE WAS ANY
SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE AS TO STATE OF HOSTILITIES BETWEEN
PINPOINT BOMBING OF ACTUAL SOVIET BASES IN CUBA AND ACTUAL INVASION OF ISLAND TO LIQUIDATE THESE BASES. NO ONE TRIED TO
ANSWER HIS QUESTION.

FINLETTER

MJA

Note: Advance copy to SS, 10/28/62, 10 PM, JAW.

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

52 EYES ONLY Action

SECRET

Control: Rec'd:

19528 OCTOBER 28. 1962

5:44 PM

uùī

Info

SS

FROM: PARIS

TO: Secretary of State

NO: POLTO CIRCULAR 12. OCTOBER 28, 8 PM (SECTION II OF II)

NIACT

ACTION DEPARTMENT, ALL OTHERS FOR INFORMATION

REFERENCE: DEPCIRTELS 744 778 AND TOPOLS 574 578

STATED HAD RECEIVED NEW MESSAGES WHICH CONTAINED

HIS GOVTES EVALUATION SOVIET MOVES AND

COMMENTS _____EVALUATION WHICH _____PROCEEDED TO READ TO COUNCIL. (ASSUME DEPARTMENT HAS BOTH) PRESUMABLY THOSE RE-

FERRED TO IN TOPOL 581).

AGAIN EXPRESSING FULL SOLIDARITY WITH US ACTION, EXPRESSED FEAR THAT CUBA AND BERLIN MIGHT BE MORE FIRMLY LINKED IN NEAR FUTURE. THERE HAD BEEN CONSIDERABLE SLOW-

DOWN IN CIVILIAN TRAFFIC TO BERLIN. BUT WHETHER THIS DE-LIBERATE AND FULLY CONNECTED WITH CUBA NOT CLEAR. IN ANY

EVENT. HE URGED THAT NO MATTER WHAT SMALL OR LARGE

HARRASSMENTS MIGHT TAKE PLACE, THEY SHOULD BE RESISTED MOST FIRMLY UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES UNTIL CUBAN MATTER SETTLED

THEN MADE STRONG STATEMENT FAVORING US ACTION UNDER-CINING JUPITERS ARE DEFENSIVE WEAPONS FOR THE DEFENSE NOT JUST OF TURKEY BUT FOR ALL OF NATO. AND THEREFORE

(A) WE SHOULD NOT NEGOTIATE ON ANY POINTS UNTIL SOVIET

MISSILES CUBA COMPLETELY LIQUIDATED, AND (B) PRESIDENT HAS

BEEN COMPLETELY RIGHT IN TURNING DOWN ANY DEAL THEN

OUTLINED CONVERSATION AND SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN WHICH LATTER TOOK TO TASK FOR FIRM PRO-US PO TO TASK FOR FIRM PRO-US POSITION

SECRET

uction from this copy

EVES ONLY

-2- POLTO CIRCULAR 12, OCTOBER 28, 8 PM (SECTION II OF II), FROM PARIS

WHICH COULD BE CATASTROPHIC FOR IF PERSISTED IN.

REPLIED FIRMLY WOULD STAND BY HER ALLIANCE
COMMITMENTS AND HER PRINCIPLES. PERMREP AGAIN URGED
NATO SOLIDARITY STATEMENT RE CUBA.

STATED BACKS US MOVES 100 PERCENT, PARTICULARLY ON PRESIDENT'S REFUSAL MAKE ANY DEAL RE JUPITERS. HE POINTED OUT IF DEAL MADE ON JUPITERS SOVIETS MIGHT ATTEMPT ESTABLISH BASES OTHER COUNTRIES AND THEN FORCE DEALS FOR LIQUIDATION OTHER NATO INSTALLATIONS WHICH WOULD EVENTUALLY COMPLETELY BREAK UP ALLIANCE. HE ADDED WHILE HIS GOVERNMENT DID NOT ALWAYS FULLY SHARE OUR ACTIONS IN TRYING TO DISCUSS MATTERS WITH SOVIETS, HE PERSONALLY THOUGHT WE WERE RIGHT IN REFUSING NEGOTIATE NOW UNTIL CUBAN MISSILE BASES FULLY LIQUIDATED. PERSONNALLY HE THOUGHT IF CUBAN MATTER COULD BE SATISFACTORILY LIQUIDATED AND IT WOULD BE CLEAR TO KHRUSHCHEV HIS COUP HAD FAILED AND WEST WAS SOLIDLY AGAINST HIS MOVES OF THIS KIND, IT MIGHT THEN BE ADVANTAGEOUS TO START NEGO... TIATING WITH A SOMEWHAT CHASTENED KHRUSHCHEV.

SPEAKING PERSONALLY, STATED HE WAS CERTAIN HIS GOVT WOULD AGREE WITH PRESIDENT'S REFUSAL ANY DEAL RE JUPITERS. HE THEN ASKED WHETHER THIS NAC MEETING WAS FOR INFORMATION OR CONSULTATION, SINCE US STATEMENTS HAD EMPHASIZED WE HOPED TO SETTLE CUBAN MATTER IN CONTEXT WESTERN HEMISPHERE. US REPLIED WHILE THE PROBLEM WAS BASICALLY ONE OF WESTERN HEMISPHERE, AND THEREFORE WE WOULD RELY BASICALLY ON OUR OAS ALLIES, IT CLEAR ANY ACTION IN ANY FART OF THE WORLD INVOLVING ONE NATO PARTNER DOES AFFECT ENTIRE NATO ALLIANCE. PARTICULARLY TRUE NOW THAT KHRUSHCHEV HAD LINKED CUBA AND JUPITERS IN TURKEY. THEREFORE, THE US NOT ONLY WISHED TO GIVE ALLIANCE INFORMATION REGARDING DEVELOPMENTS, BUT DESIRED TO HAVE SUPPORT OF THE ACTION WE HAVE TAKEN, PARTICULARLY IN TURNING DOWN JUPITER DEAL.

INTERJECTED THAT HIS GOVT DEFINITELY DESIRED THAT CONSULTATIONS IN FULLEST MEANING OF THE WORD SHOULD CONTINUE

(DURING)

-3- POLTO CIRCULAR 12, OCTOBER 28, 8 PM (SECTION 11 OF 11), FROM PARIS

DURING THIS ENTIRE CRISIS BECAUSE DEVELOPMENTS COULD TAKE

REITERATING HIS GOVT'S STRONG APPROVAL US ACTION CUBA,
STATED THAT WHILE HE HAD NO INSTRUCTIONS, HE SURE HIS GOVT
WOULD BACK OUR ACTION ON JUPITERS, SINCE THESE ARE NATO
WEAPONS AND ANY ACTION TO REMOVE THEM, REPLACE THEM, OR
MAKE ANY OTHER ARRANGEMENTS TO COVER THE SAME DEFENSE NEEDS
MUST BE PASSED BY NATO AS A WHOLE. HE THEN STATED HE IMPRESSED
BYL ICOLLEAGUE'S STATEMENT AND HOPED ALL EFFORTS
WOULD BE MADE TO AVOID USE OF FORCE. HOWEVER, SINCE IT MAY
NOT BE POSSIBLE AVOID USE OF FORCE, NAC CONSULTATIONS MUST
TAKE PLACE CONTINUOUSLY. THEN EMPHASIZED WHILE HE AGREED
WITH OTHERS WE MIGHT INTENSIFY DISCUSSIONS DISARMAMENT AFTER
CUBAN MATTER SETTLED, SHOULD NOT SHOW MORE DESIRE TO MAKE
CONCESSIONS IN DISARMAMENT AFTER CUBA SETTLED BECAUSE THIS
WOULD GIVE IMPRESSION TO KHRUSHCHEV HE HAD MADE GAIN BY
CREATING CUBAN CRISIS.

SAID HE HAD NO DIRECT INSTRUCTIONS IN REGARD TO THIS METING, BUT HIS FONOFF HAD INFORMED THE UNITED STATES GOVT IT BACKED FULLY US ACTION RE CUBA. WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS BUT REITERATED HIS GOVT S FIRM PUBLIC STAND FOR US.

JHIS UNDERSTANDING TODAY'S MEETING WAS (1) TO GET CONSENSUS COUNCIL ON ACTION TAKEN BY US ON CUBA PARTICULARLY IN REGARD TO JUPITERS; (2) TO KEEP NAC INFORMED AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE OF DEVELOPMENTS, AND (3) TO DO AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE TO FORECAST FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS IN ORDER THAT NAC MIGHT BE PREPARED FOR ALL CONTINGENCIES.

THEN BROUGHT UP FACT THAT THERE WERE MANY RUMORS
THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS PLANNING UNILATERAL BOMBARDMENT
OF CUBA WITHOUT ANY WARNING, CONSULTATION WITH NAC OR WITH
UN. US REPLIED COULD NOT GIVE AN ANSWER TO THIS MATTER,
SINCE SUCH DECISION MIGHT BE GOVERNED PRIMARILY BY MILITARY
QUESTION, BUT STATED WE WOULD TRY TO CONSULT WHENEVER WE
COULD, BUT ONE COULD NOT GUARANTEE THIS WOULD ALWAYS BE
POSSIBLE.

-4- POLTO CIRCULAR 12, OCTOBER 28, 8 PM (SECTION II OF II), FROM:
PARIS

STATE THAT THEY HAD JUST RECEIVED INFORMATION OF IMPORTANT MILITARY BUILD-UP IN BULGARIA AND THOUGHT THIS SHOULD BE BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF THE COUNCIL BECAUSE IT MIGHT INDICATE A PLAN OF SOVIET BLOC DIVERSION.

ACTING SECRETARY GENERAL SUMMED UP AS FOLLOWS:

- 1. THERE WAS A FULL NAC CONSENSUS ON THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE SOVIET . MENACE AND THREAT BY PLACING OFFENSIVE MISSILES CUBA AND FULL SUPPORT FOR US POSITION.
- 2. ALL AGREED IT MOST HELPFUL HAVE FULL OAS SUPPORT FOR US ACTION.
- 3. ALL AGREED THAT NO NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD TAKE PLACE UNTIL CUBAN BASES FULLY LIQUIDATED.
- 4. ALL ARE IN ABSOLUTE AGREEMENT AGAINST ANY TRADE RE JUPITERS.
- 5. ALL AGREED THAT SOVIET UNION MUST BE MADE TO REALIZE MUST DROP CUBAN MISSILE VENTURE BEFORE WEST CAN START MEANING-FUL NEGOTIATIONS WHICH COULD TAKE PLACE IF CUBA SETTLED.
- 6. ALL NAC MEMBERS WISHED TO MAINTAIN CONTINUOUS CONTACT AND MEET AS OFTEN AS POSSIBLE IN ORDER TO ASSURE COLLECTIVE BACKING OF ALL NAC MEMBERS FOR ACTION TAKEN IN THIS CRISIS.

WHILE

-5- POLTO CIRCULAR 12, OCTOBER 28, 8 PM (SECTION 11 OF 11), PARIS

WHILE COLONNA DID NOT EMPHASIZE IN HIS SUMMARY, IT WAS MOST CLEAR DESIRE OF PERMREPS THAT ONCE CUBA PROBLEM SETTLED SATISFACTORILY, THERE SHOULD BE FIRM EFFORTS BY WEST FOR GENERAL NEGOTIATIONS WITH SOVIETS ON ALL MAJOR PROBLEMS.

FINLETTER

MJA

Note: Advance copy to SS, 10/28/62, 10 PM, JAW

EXCISED COPY FOLLOWS

epartment of Stale 52 SECRE TITS CHIL Control: 19521 Action OCTOBER 28, 1962 Res'c: **BB** 5:26 PM FROM: PARIS Info Cat A Caption removed: 007 transferred to 9/FADMS TO: Secretary of State Cat. B - Transferred to OZFADRO POLTO CIRCULAR 12, OCTOBER 28 onto BER 28 NO: Cat. C - Caption and custody retained by S/S Reviewed by: Elijah Ketly Jr. NIACT Date: ACTION DEPARTMENT, ALL OTHERS FOR INFORMATION DEPCIRTELS 744 778 AND TOPOLS 574 578 REFERENCE: FOLLOWING DETAILED REPORT SPECIAL NAC MEETING 1000 28TH (HIGHLIGHTS POLTO 512). ACTING SECRETARY GENERAL (COLONNA) OPENED MEETING BY ANNOUNCING UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAD ASKED FOR SPECIAL MEETING IN ORDER INFORM NAC LATEST CUBAN DEVELOPMENTS.

US THEN OPENED REMARKS BY EMPHASIZING SERIOUSNESS OF SITUATION AND NEED TO GET SOONEST REACTION NATO GOVERNMENTS TO VARIOUS POINTS THAT WE WOULD RAISE AND ACTION WE HAVE TAKEN AS OUTLINED REFTELS. HE STATED THAT WHILE REALIZED MOST PERM REPS COULD NOT GIVE AGREED GOVERNMENT POSITIONS. HE HOPED THEY WOULD INDICATE AS FULLY AS POSSIBLE THEIR PERSONAL REACTIONS AND WHAT THEY THOUGHT THEIR GOVERNMENTS! REACTIONS WOULD BE. US THEN PARAPHRASED GENERAL US EVALU-ATION SOVIET POLICY CONTAINED CIRCR 744. THEN READ AND DISTRIBUTED WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT CONTAINED CIRCR 788. HE FOLLOWED THIS WITH GIST TOPOL 578 CONTAINING BRIEFING PRESIDENT DESIRED BE GIVEN NAC. AFTER GIVING GIST PARA 4 THIS TELEGRAM HE GAVE GIST TYLER-HILSMAN-NITZE BRIEFING LATEST DEVELOPMENTS CONTAINED TOPOL 574 BEFORE FINISHING REST OF MATERIAL CONTAINED TOPOL 578. WE ALSO DISTRIBUTED AT MEETING WIRELESS BULLETIN OCTOBER 28 CONTAINING AMONG OTHER THINGS TEXT PRESIDENT S LETTER TO KHRUSHCHEV 27TH.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

SECRET

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS
PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED".

LECTRIC PROHIBITED TO THE PART

LECTRIC PROHIBITED PART

LECTRIC PROHIBITED PART

LECTRIC PROFIT PART

LECTRIC PROFIT PART

Children en

87- DOS 02138 PPB

SECRI.T

-2- POLTO CIRCULAR 12, OCTOBER 28, 8 PM (SECTION 1 OF 11), FROM PARIS

BELGIAN OPENED QUESTIONING BY ASKING WHETHER PRESIDENT HAD FLATLY REJECTED CUBAN_TURKISH DEAL WITHOUT LEAVING DOOR OPEN FOR SOME LATER NEGOTIATIONS. AFTER SOME DISCUSSION AND STUDY WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, IT AGREED US POSITION CALLED FOR LIQUIDATION OFFENSIVE MISSILE BASES CUBA BEFORE ANY OTHER MATTERS COULD BE DISCUSSED OR NEGOTIATED WITHIN OR OUTSIDE THE GENERAL SPHERE OF DISARMAMENT.

CANADA THEN READ HIGHLIGHTS OF LONG DIEFENBAKER STATEMENT OF OCTOBER 25 BACKING US POSITION


(6 X1) B1A3

> 11 (b) (i 1 B1A3

-3- POLTO CIRCULAR 12, OCTOBER 28, 8 PM (SECTION 1 OF 11), FROM PARIS

SECRET

-4- POLTO CIRCULAR 12, OCTOBER 28, 8 PM (SECTION 11 OF 11), FROM:
PARIS



ACTING SECRETARY GENERAL SUMMED UP AS FOLLOWS:

- 1. THERE WAS A FULL NAC CONSENSUS ON THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE SOVIET MENACE AND THREAT BY PLACING OFFENSIVE MISSILES CUBA AND FULL SUPPORT FOR US POSITION:
- 2. ALL AGREED IT MOST HELPFUL HAVE FULL OAS SUPPORT FOR US ACTION.
- 3. ALL AGREED THAT NO NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD TAKE PLACE UNTIL CUBAN BASES FULLY LIQUIDATED.
- 4. ALL ARE IN ABSOLUTE AGREEMENT AGAINST ANY TRADE RE JUPITERS.
- 5. ALL AGREED THAT SOVIET UNION MUST BE MADE TO REALIZE MUST DROP CUBAN MISSILE VENTURE BEFORE WEST CAN START MEANING. FUL NEGOTIATIONS WHICH COULD TAKE PLACE IF CUBA SETTLED.
- 6. ALL NAC MEMBERS WISHED TO MAINTAIN CONTINUOUS CONTACT AND MEET AS OFTEN AS POSSIBLE IN ORDER TO ASSURE COLLECTIVE BACKING OF ALL NAC MEMBERS FOR ACTION TAKEN IN THIS CRISIS.

WHILE

NG TELEGRAM Department of State

52 Action SS

EYES ONLY

SECRET

Contro!: Roc'd:

19528 OCTOBER 28, 1962

5:44 PM

..07

Info

FROM: PARIS

TO: Secretary of State

NO: POLTO CIRCULAR 12, OCTOBER 28, 8 PM (SECTION 11 OF 11)

NIACT

ACTION DEPARTMENT, ALL OTHERS FOR INFORMATION

REFERENCE: DEPCIRTELS 744 778 AND TOPOLS 574 578

BIA

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS HIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET -2- POLTO CIRCULAR-12, OCTOBER 28, 8 PM (SECTION II OF II), FROM. PARIS BIAZ

RE1

-3- POLTO CIRCULAR 12, OCTOBER 28, 8 PM (SECTION II OF II), FROM PARIS

ECRET

-4- POLTO CIRCULAR 12, OCTOBER 28, 8 PM (SECTION 1 OF 11), FROM PARIS

B/A3:

MJA

Note: Advance copy to SS, 10/28/62, 10 PM, JAW.

-5- POLTO CIRCULAR 12, GCTGBER 28, 8 PM (SECTION II OF II), FRO

WHILE COLONNA DID NOT EMPHASIZE IN HIS SUMMARY, IT WAS MOST CLEAR DESIRE OF PERMREPS THAT ONCE CUBA PROBLEM SETTLED SATISFACTORILY, THERE SHOULD BE FIRM EFFORTS BY WEST FOR GENERAL NEGOTIATIONS WITH SOVIETS ON ALL MAJOR PROBLEMS.

FINLETTER

MJA

Note: Advance copy to SS, 10/28/62, 10 PM, JAW